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We present an extensive, systematic study of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games on
a square lattice under a synchronous, noiseless imitation dynamics. We show that for both the
occupancy of the network and the (random) mobility of the agents there are intermediate values
that may increase the amount of cooperators in the system and new phases appear. We analytically
determine the transition lines between these phases and compare with the mean field prediction and
the observed behavior on a square lattice. We point out which are the more relevant microscopic
processes that entitle cooperators to invade a population of defectors in the presence of mobility
and discuss the universality of these results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spatially distributed viscous populations sustain coop-
eration due to the fact that individuals form clusters for
self-defense and mutual support (see Refs. [1–5] and ref-
erences therein for reviews). Nonetheless, the conditions
for the appearance and the properties of such cooper-
ative regions are not fully understood both in real and
model systems. Given that the spatial localization allows
a continuing interaction within the local neighborhood,
the population viscosity may prevent defectors from in-
vading the whole population, what otherwise occurs un-
der random mixing. Once the high viscosity constraint
is relaxed and density permits [6, 7], agents are able to
diffuse. There are many ways in which mobility [8–12]
can be implemented: it may be random [13–20], strategy
dependent [21], driven by payoff [22–25], success [26–28]
or neighborhood [29–34], take or not [25, 33, 35] ex-
cluded volume into account, be local or long ranged,
occur on a discrete lattice (regular or complex) [13–
18, 22, 28, 30, 36], in continuous space [25, 33, 35] or
in a fully connected system, it may be explicit or in-
cluded as a cost [36], etc. Our previous results [13, 17]
show that even in the simplest framework of random,
non-contingent mobility of unconditional agents, diffu-
sion is remarkably able to enhance cooperation within
broad conditions. Besides the typical interval between
generations, a new timescale is involved when mobility
is taken into account in this simple model, the diffusion
characteristic time. If the typical time a step takes to oc-
cur is much larger than the generation interval, the high
viscosity limit may be a reasonable approximation. On
the other hand, if diffusion is fast, the behavior should
approach, density permitting, the fully mixed case. An
interesting regime is when both timescales are similar: in
that case the order in which the dynamics is performed,
whether the offspring generation occurs before of after
the diffusion step, has important consequences for the
cooperative outcome [13, 17] and is often neglected.
We consider a 2 × 2 game with pure, unconditional
strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Cooperation
involves a benefit to the recipient at the expense of the
provider. Depending on the mutual choice, the earned
payoff is: a reward R (punishment P ) if both cooperate
(defect), S (sucker’s payoff) and T (temptation) if one
cooperates and the other defects, respectively. In the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, the above payoffs are
ranked as T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. Thus,
it clearly pays more to defect whatever the opponent’s
strategy: the gain will be T > R if the other cooperates
and P > S in the case of defection. The dilemma appears
since if both play D they get P , what is worse than the
reward R they would have obtained had they both played
C. On the other hand, there are situations when mutual
defection is even worst than being exploited, and P < S.
This defines a different game, in which T > R > S > P ,
known as Chicken or Snowdrift (SD) [37]. Without loss of
generality, we renormalize all values such that R = 1 and
P = 0, the values of T and S remaining as the parameters
that define the nature of the game.
In a randomly mating population (mean field limit)
with both C and D strategies present, defection will be
the most rewarding strategy for the PD game, indepen-
dently of the opponent’s choice. As shown by Nowak
and May [38], when spatial correlations are included in
the population, for example by placing the agents on a
lattice, cooperators form clusters in which the benefits of
mutual cooperation can outweigh losses against defectors,
thus enabling cooperation to be sustained, in contrast to
the spatially unstructured game, where defection is fa-
vored (these effects of the spatial structure may be due to
either the distribution of agents in space or to the context
preservation during the dynamics, see [39] for a detailed
account). Since then, the original Nowak-May version
was extended and modified in several different ways (see
Ref. [3] and references therein). Once placed on a net-
work, by analyzing the possible neighborhoods [40, 41],
one can divide the parameter space into several regions
with different levels of cooperation and spatial structures.
In this work we extend their analysis to include the SD
game, dilution and mobility of the agents, locating all
transitions between distinct phases. In the presence of
defects (density ρ < 1) but without mobility, all transi-
tions already present in the full system remain, but a few
2others appear because of the larger number of possible lo-
cal configurations. Remarkably, when diffusive processes
are also present, in which an agent jumps to an empty
site with probability m, whether new phases appear or
not depends on the chosen dynamics.
A systematic study of how often spatial structure fa-
vors cooperative behavior has been the program of a few
papers (see, for example, Refs. [39, 41–45]). The task is
not simple due to the multitude of different dynamical
rules and lattice geometries that may be considered [3].
Nonetheless, we complement these previous works by in-
cluding dilution and mobility while considering a paral-
lel imitation rule, in which each individual combats with
all its closest neighbors (if any), accumulates the corre-
sponding payoff and then may either move or try to gen-
erate its offspring. In the reproduction step, each player
compares its total payoff with those of its neighbors and
changes strategy, following the one with the greatest pay-
off among them. This strategy changing updating rule
preserves the total number of individuals, thus keeping
ρ constant. Notice that although there is no noise in
this updating rule, the random mobility to be consid-
ered here now has a similar role and prevents the system
from becoming stuck on shallow minima. Initially, an
equal number of cooperators and defectors are randomly
placed on a two dimensional square lattice of linear size L
and periodic boundary conditions, and the system is al-
lowed to evolve until a stationary state is attained, when
the measures are thus taken.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
the phase diagrams for fully occupied and diluted (with
and without random mobility) are obtained and com-
pared with numerical simulations and the mean field pre-
diction. We then discuss the possible mechanisms lead-
ing to the enhancement or inhibition of cooperation and
finally present our conclusions.
II. PHASE DIAGRAMS
When spatial correlations are not relevant, as when
all agents interact with all others (mean field limit),
the phase diagram is easily obtained, Fig. 1 (see, e.g.,
Ref. [42]). For P = 0 and R = 1 there are two transition
lines, one at T = 1 and other at S = 0, dividing the TS
plane into two sections above T = 1 [46], the PD game
for S < 0 and the SD for S > 0. When S < 0 (and
T > 1), defectors dominate and the relative [47] density
of cooperators, ρc, is equal to 0. On the other hand,
for S > 0 (and again T > 1), cooperators and defectors
coexist with ρc = S/(S + T − 1).
When spatial localization becomes an important fac-
tor, the corresponding phase diagram can be constructed
by analyzing all the neighborhood configurations that are
possible in the confrontation between two agents hav-
ing different strategies. The transitions present in the
phase diagram consider all such configurations, irrespec-
tive of their probability of occurrence. If a given local
FIG. 1. Mean field (fully mixed) phase diagram for P = 0
and T > R = 1. The solid line shows the transition from the
defector dominated phase (S < 0, PD game) to the coexis-
tence one (S > 0, SD game). The scale at the right indicates
the density of cooperators, ρc = S/(S + T − 1), for S > 0,
with darker colors assigned to larger ρc.
configuration is rather rare, it might happen that our
finite time simulations on a finite lattice are not able
to sample it and, as a consequence, two phases might
look rather similar or perhaps identical. In the follow-
ing, we consider a square lattice with the von Neumann
neighborhood (nearest neighbors only) and without self-
interaction, but the results can be extended to other lat-
tices and neighborhoods, although the complexity of the
task may vary. Unless specified, all simulated systems
have a linear length of L = 100, and results are averaged
over 100 different initial random configurations such that
ρc(0) = ρd(0) = ρ/2. The number of initial steps ne-
glected before the asymptotic state depends on the den-
sity and mobility. In order to compare with our previ-
ous works, we consider the “imitate-the-best” dynamics,
in which all individual’s strategies are synchronously re-
placed by the strategy adopted by the individual with the
highest collected payoff in the neighborhood. Besides this
synchronous updating of the strategies, a Monte Carlo
Step (MCS) also comprises an attempt, by each agent,
to diffuse: each agent blindly chooses a neighboring site
and, if it is empty, jumps to it with probability m. Us-
ing the notation of Schweitzer et al. [41], Knθ denotes
the local occupation pattern and p(Knθ ) the payoff ac-
quired by an individual in such a configuration. Here,
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} gives the total number of cooperators in
the local neighborhood and θ ∈ {0, 1} describes whether
the center cell is occupied by a defector or a cooperator,
respectively. In the absence of empty sites, the number
of defectors in a neighborhood is 4−n. The construction
of the phase diagram amounts to the analysis of all the
possible confrontations ofKn00 andK
n1
1 , for n0 ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and n1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The value of n0 = 0 is not im-
portant because a D having four D neighbors will either
be surrounded by Ds with the same payoff or with higher
payoff D players that have C neighbors, since T > P .
3FIG. 2. Two dimensional cross section of the phase diagram
displaying the asymptotic density of cooperators, for full oc-
cupancy (ρ = 1) and P = 0, T > R = 1 and S < R. The
solid lines represent the functions fn0n1 which delimit dif-
ferent phases (functions having the same n0 intercept at the
same point on the line S = 1). White regions are dominated
by defectors, while the blue/grey ones have some fraction of
cooperators, its density indicated by the scale on the right.
The color code does not represent what happens at the transi-
tion lines, where draws happen and the fraction of cooperators
may differ from the two neighboring phases. Notice that, for a
fixed T , ρc is not monotonic in S (see Fig. 3). The dotted line
T = 2−S is a usual choice for the payoff matrix: T = 1+r and
S = 1 − r, r being a payoff parameter. Another traditional
choice, also shown as a dotted line, is S = 0 and separates the
PD and SD games (however, this is a transition line in the
mean field case). The horizontal line at T = 4/3 separates
the low C region (above) from the high C one (below).
The value of n0 = 4 is not considered because with the
chosen payoffs (T > R), a D with four C neighbors al-
ways has the highest possible payoff. This value might
play a role when considering games in which (T < R), as
in the Stag Hunt [42, 48].
A. Full occupancy (ρ = 1)
We initially consider the simpler case without empty
sites (ρ = 1), in which obviously no mobility, as imple-
mented here, is possible. For the PD and SD games, the
following family of functions compare the payoffs that
result from all possible confrontations of a D and a C,
having local neighborhoods given by Kn00 and K
n1
1 , re-
spectively,
fn0n1 =
n1R+ (4 − n1)S − (4− n0)P
n0
. (1)
If T > fn0n1 , then the D with local configurationK
n0
0 will
beat the C with local configuration Kn11 ; if T < fn0n1 ,
then the D will beaten; and if T = fn0n1 , there will be a
draw between the two players. Indeed, the behavior at a
transition point may be different from the neighboring re-
gions, what makes each segment between line crossings a
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FIG. 3. (Top) Asymptotic density of cooperators as a function
of S for T = 1.4, when the lattice is fully occupied (ρ =
1) and the initial state is random. Notice both the abrupt
change of ρc when a transition line is crossed and the non
monotonic behavior of ρc. On those lines, the value of ρc may
be very different from the neighboring phases. Also shown is
the fully-mixed result, for which the density of cooperators is
non zero only for S > 0 and is an increasing function of S
in that interval. Notice that for the region around the weak
PD (S = 0), spatial correlations enhance cooperation [38].
(Middle) Fraction of active sites ρa for the same parameters.
Besides the transition points, only the 0.6 < ρ < 0.7 region
breaks the increasing monotonicity. (Bottom) The fraction
ρper of cooperator-defector pairs (to be compared with the
snapshots of Fig. 4).
phase in itself. The phase diagram will then be composed
of the regions defined by all these functions, together with
the inequalities that define the games. For given values
of R, P and ni in the allowed ranges, these 15 func-
tions, which can be separated into 3 groups depending on
n0, represent the values of T where there are transitions
which divide the parameter space into different phases.
Without loss of generality, we can take R = 1, so that the
above functions will describe planes in the three dimen-
sional space of T , P and S, leading to a complex phase
diagram in three dimensions. The usual choice of P = 0
takes a 2d cross-section of this three dimensional param-
eter space allowing a simpler description of the phase
diagram, as shown in Fig. 2. Within each phase, the be-
havior is the same, and it is enough to numerically study
a single representative point for synchronous imitation
dynamics, as can be seen in Fig. 3, where different sim-
ulation points in the same phase lead to the same out-
come. The transition between two neighboring phases
is usually discontinuous, the density of cooperators pre-
senting abrupt jumps when a transition line is crossed,
as can be seen in Fig. 3. The dashed lines in Fig. 2
are not transition lines, but two common parametriza-
tions of the payoff matrix for these games. The diagonal
dashed line considers T = 1 + r and S = 1 − r (such
that T + S = 2), where r is a parameter. The second
parametrization line, the vertical one at S = 0, is ex-
actly at the border between the SD and PD games, and
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FIG. 4. Snapshots after 103 MCS showing typical configurations for several values of T and S for ρ = 1. Blue/yellow
(black/grey) sites represent cooperators/defectors, respectively. Larger levels of cooperation are associated with the presence
of a long tail in the group size distribution, while the compactness of the large cooperator groups depends on S, being large
(small) for small (large) S. Notice that the rightmost snapshot is the only one with T = 1.8. In this last case, 2× 2 squares of
defectors separated by lines of cooperators form a fully stable structure since p(K41) > p(K
2
0 ) > p(K
2
1). Because of the random
initial state, we only observe patches of such structure.
is known as the weak PD. Notice that several phases are
left out with such parametrizations.
Fig. 3 (top) shows, for T = 1.4, the fraction of co-
operators as a function of S, along with the mean field
result. Two important features can be noticed. First of
all, while for S < 0 the spatial correlations significantly
increase the amount of cooperation when compared to
the mean field limit, this is not always the case for S > 0
(SD). Indeed, for S & 0.24, the mean field curve lies
above the lattice results, while for 0 < S . 0.24, spatial
correlation improves cooperation. The second evident
feature is the non-monotonicity of ρc: as S increases, one
would intuitively expect larger levels of cooperation; in-
stead, some regions (most prominently, around S = 0.65)
present a smaller than expected fraction of cooperators.
A large amount of cooperation is related to the existence
of a long tail in the distribution of group sizes (a group
is defined as a set of neighboring, same strategy agents),
as is the case, for example, for S = 0 and 0.8. On the
other hand, for S = 0.65 the system has a much lower
level of cooperation and very few large clusters. This
can be checked in Fig. 4 in which some characteristic
snapshots are shown for T = 1.4 and 1.8. For S = 0,
leftmost snapshot, the minimal cooperative cluster able
to grow is 2 × 2, while smaller or linear clusters are re-
moved in the first steps of the dynamics. The surviving
clusters are far away from each other and grow through
flat edges (with at least two cooperators) while diagonals
are stable (although both cooperators and defectors at
a diagonal interface have two neighboring cooperators,
and p(K21 ) < p(K
2
0 ), the cooperators are backed up by
interior cooperators with higher payoffs). Thus, rather
large and compact clusters may grow before starting to
interfere with each other. Once they get close enough,
defectors trapped between these clusters will have coop-
erators at both sides, and therefore will acquire a large
payoff and reproduce. These defector clusters will grow
as well until a dynamical equilibrium is achieved. For
S = 0.5, second snapshot, since p(K01) > p(K
1
0 ), single
cooperators are able to seed a growing cluster and survive
in a sea of defectors. The clusters are much less compact
than in the previous case and the lattice is populated by
those smaller clusters that were decimated in the S = 0
case. Being less compact, clusters increase the amount of
interactions between cooperators and defectors and both
the fraction of interface and active sites increase. For the
region around S = 0.65, the only difference in the ranking
of payoffs is that we now have p(K11 ) > p(K
2
0), while for
S = 0.5 it was p(K11) < p(K
2
0 ). Interestingly, although a
cooperator with a single cooperative neighbor fares bet-
ter for S = 0.65 than for 0.5, when compared with a
defector with two cooperating neighbors, the density of
cooperators is strongly reduced when compared with the
neighboring regions.
If one ranks all values of p(Knθ ), for the values of T
and S considered in Fig. 4, as S increases, the unique
modification is that p(K20 ) moves further down in the
payoff ranking. For S = 0.8, for example, p(K20 ) and
p(K01 ) switch places (when compared with S = 0.65)
and p(K20) < p(K
0
1 ). A sublattice of cooperators (or,
equivalently, defectors) separated by every other site is
stable, while the intermediate sites may flip from one to
the other. For a random initial state, the lattice will be
populated with small patches of such a stable structure.
In the PD region, cooperation is sustained by compact
groups of cooperators while they decrease in compact-
ness as S becomes larger, accompanied by an increase
of cooperator-defector interfaces, since unilateral coop-
eration becomes worthwhile. It is important to empha-
size that although it seems at first that the increase of
S would enhance cooperation in a population, what it
indeed promotes is a continued interaction between co-
operators and defectors, since the punishment for being
exploited decreases. In fact, one may introduce a measure
of such exploitation as the relative number of CD pairs
(ρper), also related to the total perimeter of cooperator
clusters and shown in Fig. 3, bottom panel. These in-
terfaces can also be directly observed in the snapshots of
Fig. 4, in the form of checkerboard-like regions in which
large groups of cooperators exist with nested defectors.
Notice that although ρc is not monotonic in S, ρper is an
almost monotonically increasing function of S (the re-
5FIG. 5. Phase diagram for diluted lattices without mobility (m = 0) and several densities ρ. The color code indicates the
level of cooperation ρc/ρ. The solid lines represent the functions fn0n1e0e1 which delimit different phases. Although the levels
of cooperation are quite similar to those of Fig. 2, a few more lines (and, consequently, a large number of new phases) are
introduced due to dilution. This is the case of the four lines that cross at (S, T ) = (1, 3/2) and another one that passes through
the point (1, 3). In the bottom figures, for ρ = 0.3 and 0.5, cooperation is sustained, even if at low levels, in all regions.
gion 0.6 < ρ < 0.7 is very particular: besides the strong
depression in the amount of cooperators, it also breaks
the monotonicity, as a function of S, of both ρper and the
fraction of strategy switching, i.e. active, sites, ρa).
Interestingly, the elongated structures of cooperators
in the SD game, observed in the rightmost snapshot of
Fig. 4, are similar to those observed in Ref. [49] although
the dynamics and the parameters are not the same, indi-
cating that the results found here for a specific dynamical
rule may be more generally valid. In addition, those den-
dritric structures are but one way of creating large inter-
face structures, alternatives being isolated cooperators or
checkerboard-like groups [50].
B. Diluted lattices (ρ < 1) without mobility (m = 0)
Disorder may be included in these games in several dif-
ferent ways, for example, as site [6] or bond [51] dilution.
We consider here the former, once the mobility mecha-
nism that we will later use is dependent on the existence
of empty sites. In Ref. [6] we have seen that, for the weak
version of the PD game, a small amount of disorder gives
rise to pinning points that prevent the strategy switch-
ing waves from traversing the system. Indeed, groups of
cooperators can be shielded by empty sites, what could
be interpreted as natural landscape defenses, and keep
their strategy for long intervals of time. These long last-
ing strategies may be observed, for example, by measur-
ing the persistence function, the fraction of agents that
did not switch strategy since t = 0. The existence of
an asymptotic zero persistence has been shown [6] to be
related to the existence of an expressive number of ac-
tive sites (those that changed strategy since the last time
step) at larger densities, while for smaller ones the per-
sistence attains a finite plateau and there is a vanishing
number of such active sites. In particular, there is an
optimal intermediate density at which cooperators have
a maximum population, what remains valid even when
the imitating updating dynamics is stochastic [7]. In this
last case, in which the optimal cooperative state is closely
related to the percolation threshold [7], the existence of
fractal clusters at the threshold seems to be important
as neither disconnected nor compact clusters are present
that help defectors to invade and exploit cooperator com-
munities.
We here extend the results of Ref. [6] for other values
of S (see also Ref. [17]), and explore its microscopic inter-
pretation. The introduction of empty sites changes the
phase diagram by allowing new configurations of local
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FIG. 6. Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc versus
S (T = 1.4, R = 1 and P = 0) for different values of the
density ρ without mobility (m = 0). The panel at the bot-
tom shows, as vertical lines, the transition points for ρ = 1:
S = −0.3, −0.2, 2/15, 0.35, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.7. In the remaining
panels, in which ρ < 1, new transitions appear at S = 0.2,
7/15, 0.8, 0.9 and 14/15. Interestingly, besides the transition
at S = 0.4 representing a strong change in ρc, whether the
jump is upward or downward depends on the value of ρ. Also
shown (curved line) is the mean field result. Notice that for
large values of S, small and large densities fare worse than
the mean field and cooperators perform better only for inter-
mediate densities in the presence of spatial correlations.
structures. Therefore, the phase diagram will be com-
posed by the lines that were already present in the case
without empty sites, Fig. 2, plus a few more. Besides
such new phases, the amount of cooperation will also de-
pend on the total density ρ [6].
Extending the notation introduced earlier, the local
neighborhoods shall be denoted by Kneθ , where θ ∈
{0, 1} describes the occupation of the center cell, e ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} gives the total number of empty sites in the
local neighborhood and n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} (n ≤ 4 − e and
n0 6= 0) gives the total number of cooperators in the local
neighborhood. Now, the number of defectors is given by
4 − n − e. In this way, we have Kn0θ ≡ K
n
θ . In addi-
tion to the functions given in Eq. (1), the following func-
tions which compare the local neighborhoods Kn0e00 and
Kn1e11 , with e1 6= 0, should also be taken into account
fn0n1e0e1 =
n1R+ [4− (n1 + e1)]S − [4− (n0 + e0)]P
n0
.
(2)
Using the above notation, fn0n100 ≡ fn0n1 . Not all of
these functions are used, since many give conditions in
the region T ≤ R (valid for other games).
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FIG. 7. Average fraction ρa of active (green/light grey circles)
and pairs of opposite strategies (blue/dark grey squares), ρper,
versus S (T = 1.4, R = 1 and P = 0) for different values of
the density ρ without mobility (m = 0). The transition lines
follow Fig. 6.
The values of (n0, n1, e0, e1) that contribute to the di-
agram in the range T > R and which lead to functions
different from the ones listed for the case ρ = 1 are:
(2, 3, 0, 1), (2, 2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0, 1), (2, 0, 0, 1), (1, 3, 0, 1),
(1, 2, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0, 2) ≡
(2, 4, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0, 2) ≡ (2, 2, 0, 0). It should be noted
that this diagram is only valid for the case P = 0, be-
cause in this case a D with a D neighbor is equivalent to
a D with an empty neighbor. If P 6= 0, then these two
configurations are not the same, what will give rise to fur-
ther phase separating lines. Fig. 5 shows the diagrams
for several values of ρ. For ρ = 0.9, it is not very different
from the full ρ = 1 case, apart from an intensification of
cooperation in the lower right corner of the figure, what is
consistent with the results of Refs. [6, 7] that showed that
a small amount of quenched dilution is an enhancement
factor for cooperation as it prevents defectors from invad-
ing cooperator clusters. Stronger deviations are observed
for ρ = 0.5: although presenting cooperation in the whole
region shown, the phases that presented cooperation pre-
viously now have a smaller density of cooperators. For
small densities, mainly below the percolation threshold,
the fate of isolated clusters only depends on their ini-
tial composition of Cs and Ds. Thus, regions that were
previously unable to sustain cooperation now have small
but finite fractions of cooperators (e.g., in the left top
corner of the phase diagrams in Fig. 5). For even smaller
densities, the final configuration differs little from the ini-
tial one, ρc tends to 1/2 and the phase diagram becomes
homogeneous, independent of S and T .
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FIG. 8. Snapshots for m = 0, after 104 MCS, showing typ-
ical configurations for several values of S with T = 1.4 and
densities both below and above the site random percolation
threshold (ρ ≃ 0.59). Blue/yellow (black/grey) sites repre-
sent cooperators/defectors, as in Fig. 4, while white ones are
empty sites. Notice that for a given density, the empty sites
in these snapshots are in the same position.
An example of the sudden transitions occurring at the
delimiting lines between phases is shown in Fig. 6 for a
cut at T = 1.4 for several densities [17]. Again, the tran-
sitions can be observed as jumps in the value of ρc at the
specified points. The most notable transition occurs at
S = 0.4: depending on the total density ρ, the fraction of
cooperators may either jump upwards or downwards, and
the change is much more pronounced than for ρ = 1. Co-
operation is enhanced at intermediate densities and may
even fare better than the mean field (e.g., for ρ = 0.5 and
0.7 in the figure). The structures formed by cooperators
also follow the overall pattern observed for ρ = 1 and a
few examples are shown in Fig. 8: compact groups in the
PD game (left column) and dendritic or checkerboard like
in the SD game. For S = 0 (left column), although the
ever present small cooperator clusters start to increase
in size after the percolation threshold, only well above
this transition point do they occupy a large fraction of
the network. The optimal density for cooperators is not
that high when stochastic rules are used, being shifted
towards the threshold [7]. For S = 0.8 (right column),
on the other hand, cooperators group themselves into
dendritic or checkerboard structures (or stay isolated).
The density of cooperators is monotonic in S only for
very low densities, Fig. 6, while for large S (most no-
tably for S > 0.4), ρc tends to decrease and becomes non
monotonic. More information can be obtained by mea-
suring the fraction of active sites, ρa, and the fraction of
pairs of different strategies, ρper, as shown in Fig. 7. For
low densities, ρ = 0.3 and 0.5 in Fig. 7, the configura-
tion is almost frozen and both quantities are very close
to zero. Otherwise, they present a tendency to increase
with S (albeit exceptional intervals are still present). In-
terestingly, although there seems to be a correlation be-
tween the two parameters for all densities, deviations are
stronger close to the optimum density (see the case of
ρ = 0.9 in Fig. 7).
C. Diluted lattices (ρ < 1) with mobility (m 6= 0)
In the case m = 0 studied in Ref. [6] (T = 1.4 and
S = 0), and for the noiseless imitation rule considered
here, the fraction of cooperators starts to increase again
around the site random percolation threshold (ρ ≃ 0.593
in the square lattice). At low densities, cooperators per-
sist on some isolated clusters because of a favorable ini-
tial condition that allowed them to overcome defectors.
In this regime, and depending on how mobility is imple-
mented, defectors may act as free riders that eventually
exploit the whole system (remember that random diffu-
sion is a disaggregating factor), leading to the extinction
of cooperators. As shown in Ref. [13], there is a mini-
mum density above which cooperators are able to survive
in the presence of mobility. Although in some cases such
density is above the percolation threshold, and coopera-
tion seems to need an underlying percolating cluster in
order to be maintained when m 6= 0, cooperation may
also resist below the percolation threshold. Indeed, with
a smaller temptation, isolated groups of cooperators are
less predated by defectors and are able to survive.
Whether or not the phase diagram changes when ran-
dom mobility is also taken into account depends on the
details of the diffusion. When the offspring step is per-
formed before the diffusion (COD – combat-offspring-
diffusion dynamics – in the notation of Ref. [13]), no new
transition appears, and the phase diagram has the same
cross sections as those of the previous section, whatever
the value ofm, albeit with different fractions of ρc in each
phase. These diagrams are shown in Fig. 9. Notice that
many regions now are fully dominated by defectors. In
general, low mobility (left column) is more favorable to
cooperation: besides being present in more regions of the
phase diagram, the fraction of cooperators is also higher.
However, the SD game benefits much more from mobility
than the PD, as most of the shaded regions are located
for S > 0. The latter, in particular, only presents a fi-
nite fraction of cooperators for high densities (see also
Ref. [17]). Although it is difficult to summarize its gen-
eral behavior, the SD game fares better at intermediate
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FIG. 9. Phase diagrams for the case in which the diffusive step is taken after the offspring generation (COD). The smaller
mobility has more cooperative regions in the phase diagram (blue) and an overall higher level of cooperation in each region.
Notice also that the PD game does not present cooperation at low densities.
densities. In the snapshots of Fig. 10 we observe how co-
operators are able to build clusters even in the presence of
random mobility. These clusters, however, are less com-
pact than those for the case without mobility, Fig. 8. An
interesting aspect in those snapshots is the presence of de-
fector and cooperator-free regions. In the upper row, for
ρ = 0.7 (above the percolation threshold), cooperators
aggregate in isolated domains while the defectors perco-
late throughout the lattice. In the bottom row, on the
other hand, although the connected domains are smaller,
a different kind of order can be observed: cooperators and
vacant sites form large regions free of defectors. These
cooperators, due to the rattling aspect of diffusion, are
indeed correlated. Moreover, these defector-free regions
now percolate. For this COD dynamics, the agents do
not carry any payoff with them, since the combat and
offspring steps are performed in succession before diffu-
sion. In other words, there is no memory of the previous
location.
Although evaporation is an important mechanism to
decrease cooperation (cooperators that move away from
the surface of clusters tend to become defectors), when
its rate is not too large or if diffusion is prevented by
geometric hindrance at larger densities, clusters may be
stable. If the cluster surface is locally flat, cooperators
located at the surface make contact with three other co-
operators and have high payoff. Moreover, they also com-
pare their payoff with interior cooperators whose payoff is
even larger. These regions are prone to cooperation and
any defector that, after diffusion, gets in contact with the
cooperative surface will be assimilated. This is the basic
growth mechanism in the COD case.
The phase diagram for the CDO (combat-diffusion-
offspring) case is slightly different from the one for empty
sites or COD dynamics. This is due to the fact that in
them, the configurations given by K0e00 (D without co-
operating neighbors) never compete with any Kn1e11 (C
with cooperating neighbors) configuration. In the CDO,
however, since the diffusion step occurs between the con-
test and the generation of offspring, the confrontations
described above are possible due to the change in configu-
ration between the two steps. Therefore, by taking these
new possibilities into account, a few more lines should
contribute to the phase diagram, namely
g(n0=0,n1,e0,e1) =
(4 − e0)P − n1R
4− (n1 + e1)
, (3)
which are valid for n0 = 0 and n1 + e1 6= 4. If the latter
inequality is not satisfied, the functions will give rise to
conditions on R and P . These functions mark transitions
at S = g(n0=0,n1,e0=0,e1), for the different possible values
of n1, e1 and e0. For R = 1 and P = 0, this means
that there will be new transition points at the following
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FIG. 10. Snapshots for m = 0.1 and T = 1.4 with COD dynamics for several times, showing typical configurations. The top
row is for ρ = 0.7 and S = 0, while the bottom row shows ρ = 0.3 and S = 0.5. Blue/yellow (black/grey) sites represent
cooperators/defectors, as in Fig. 4, while white ones are empty sites. The bottom row, despite its small density (below the
percolation threshold), has percolating defector-free regions. The upper row presents, on the other hand, cooperator-free
percolating regions.
values of S: −3, −2, −1, −1/2, −1/3 and 0, indepen-
dent of e0. No new transition appears for S > 0. It is
interesting to notice that due to the new transition line
at S = 0, this is the only case (besides the mean field)
in which the regions around the weak PD case (S = 0)
differ. These lines are shown in Fig. 11 for several values
of ρ and m. Most of the regions are fully dominated by
cooperators, although a few regions (mainly at small S,
large T ) are cooperator free. As shown in Fig. 11, right
column, the high mobility case (m = 1) is more favor-
able to cooperation at low densities. On the other hand,
for low mobilities (left column), at intermediate densities
the fraction of cooperators is larger. Differently from the
COD dynamics, here the agents move after the combat
and thus carry part of their previous history along. This
memory of their recent combat is important to under-
stand the mechanism responsible for the enhancement of
cooperation. As an illustration,
consider the case studied in Ref. [13] in which a C
dominated phase occurs for 0.18 . ρ . 0.73 for T = 1.4,
S = 0 and m = 1 (top row of Fig. 12). For the low
densities close to ρ ≈ 0.18 the mechanism does not rely
on the existence of a spanning cluster of agents. In-
deed, the largest occurrence is of single and two agent
clusters. The transition rate rc with which defectors
become cooperators depends on the local neighborhood
of the two agents at the moment in which their payoffs
were collected (combat) and has two main contributions:
rc = Prob(K
1e1
1 ,K
0e0
0 ) − Prob(K
0e1
1 ,K
1e0
0 ), where the
probabilities are the number of the given encounter di-
vided by the total number of active sites averaged over
time in the beginning of the simulation (t ≤ 100). That
is, the number of cooperators increases when a C with
one C neighbor (K1e11 ) meets, after the jump, a D with-
out C neighbors (K0e00 ) and decreases when a D also with
one C neighbor (K1e00 ) meets, after the jump, a C with-
out other C neighbors (K0e11 ). In the bottom row, left
side, of Fig. 12 we depict these processes, each one in
the region in which it is dominant, along with the curve
showing that rc changes sign around the point at which
the density of cooperators explodes. What changes from
one case to the other as ρ increases is that clusters with
an increasing number of agents become more common
and give support to the stability of the CC pair.
This transition at low densities does not occur in the
COD dynamics and is the mechanism that allows a C to
leave a C cluster and continue cooperating in the CDO
dynamics.
The region in which the fraction of cooperators starts
to decrease (ρ & 0.73) is above the percolation thresh-
old, the system is denser and it is much more likely that
an individual has several neighbors. Consequently, the
microscopic process responsible for this decrease is dif-
ferent from the previous one. In effect, the observed
decrease in the density of cooperators as the lattice ap-
proaches full occupancy is rather general, non diffusive
and reminiscent of the m = 0 behavior for increasing
densities [6]. Indeed, as the number of empty sites de-
creases, irrespective of the mobility, the number of active
sites increases, signaling that there is less defect-induced
pinning in the system and cooperators become more vul-
nerable to defectors. The mobility m, also being a depin-
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FIG. 11. Two dimensional cross section of the phase diagram when mobility is considered after the combats (CDO dynamics).
Notice that although for m = 1 the density of cooperators is monotonic, for m = 0.1 it is not, and intermediate densities sustain
more cooperation.
ning mechanism, plays a role by shifting the transition
to smaller values of ρ. It should be noted that the main
microscopic processes that drive a given transition are
dependent on the values of T and S, besides the system
occupancy, because a change in ρ modifies the expected
number of neighbors that each individual has. In the
particular case of Fig. 12, we may also point that, dif-
ferently from the low density transition, there are many
microscopic processes that are relevant for increase of de-
fectors. As an example, consider those associated with
neighborhoods K2e11 and K
0e0
0 (D → C) or K
1e1
1 and
K3e00 (C → D). We show in the right part of Fig. 12,
the order parameter that can be built from these pro-
cesses, rc = Prob(K
2e1
1 ,K
0e0
0 ) − Prob(K
1e1
1 ,K
3e0
0 ), and
how it changes sign at the transition. There are, however,
other possible combinations of microscopic processes giv-
ing rise to order parameters changing sign in this region
(although not necessarily at the same precise value).
For the COD dynamics, it is also not easy to single
out a few processes that are responsible for changing the
amount of cooperators.
As an example, we consider the case T = 1.4, S = 0
and very low mobility (m = 0.01) studied in Ref. [13].
The larger the mobility, the larger is the density capa-
ble of supporting cooperation. For m → 0, this mini-
mum density seems to approach the random site perco-
lation threshold. Above the transition, in the phase pre-
senting both cooperators and defectors, there is a great
chance that an individual has 2 or 3 neighbors. The
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FIG. 12. Top: Average fraction of cooperating individuals for
CDO dynamics, m = 1, T = 1.4 and S = 0. For intermediate
densities, cooperators dominate. At low densities (ρ . 0.18)
there is a discontinuous transition to a phase in which all
agents become defectors while at high densities, ρ & 0.73, the
all C state continuously turns into a mixed strategy phase.
Bottom: order parameters indicating the leading microscopic
processes originating the intermediate all C phase. We also
indicate the more relevant microscopic process in each region.
Yellow/light grey are defectors, blue/dark grey are cooper-
ators, and white boxes are empty sites to which one of the
agents may jump. The letters indicate the payoff accumulated
by the combating agents. Notice that the rightmost process
is not diffusive. Below ρ ≃ 0.18, since it has a C neighbor, the
defector has payoff T when it collides with the single cooper-
ator whose payoff is zero, winning the combat. On the other
hand, above ρ ≃ 0.18, the cooperator with payoff R, because
of its C neighbor, outperforms the defector whose payoff is
zero. Being the dominant process, this leads to a fast increase
in the population of cooperators. Up to ρ ≃ 0.73, cooperators
still have an advantage when interacting with defectors after
the jump, since they had accumulated enough payoff from
their previous interaction. However, above this value of ρ, a
non diffusive process, reminiscent of the original, full density
PD game, allows defectors to invade previously cooperative
regions, thus decreasing ρc.
main microscopic mechanisms responsible for the tran-
sition are three encounters: K2e11 and K
1e0
0 (D → C);
K1e11 and K
2e0
0 (C → D); K
0e1
1 and K
1e0
0 (C → D).
The latter corresponds to a C player leaving a C clus-
ter and meeting a D. In Fig. 13, we show the order
parameter rc = Prob(K
2e1
1 ,K
1e0
0 ) − Prob(K
1e1
1 ,K
2e0
0 ) −
Prob(K0e11 ,K
1e0
0 ), where the probabilities are calculated
as above in the CDO case.
It takes the value 0 at ρ ≃ 0.56, slightly below the
transition density. This small difference is due to the fact
that many other, less frequent processes have not been
included in the order parameter. It should be noted that
as the mobility probability m increases, the evaporation
of C clusters becomes greater and the transition is driven
to higher values of ρ. At these higher concentrations,
many other microscopic processes become important to
determine the value of ρ at which the transition occurs.
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FIG. 13. Top: Average fraction of cooperating individuals
for the COD dynamics, m = 0.01, T = 1.4 and S = 0. The
system presents a transition from a cooperator-free phase to
a coexistence phase near the percolation threshold ρ ≃ 0.59
for the square lattice. Below this density, the evaporation
of C clusters is not counterbalanced by any mechanism and
diffusion is detrimental to the population. Bottom: Order
parameter associated with the leading microscopic processes
that localize the transition to the coexistence state. Notice
that the processes depicted here are only a few of those ex-
isting at this density (also explaining why the curve does not
cross at the right value).
III. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a systematic study of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Snowdrift games, with and without ran-
dom mobility, when the evolution follows a non stochas-
tic imitation rule in which all agents, in parallel, choose
to follow their more successful neighbor. Few attempts
have been made in the literature [4, 39, 41, 43, 44, 48]
to present a comprehensive account of the possible be-
haviors of such evolutionary games. Due to the large
number of parameters and possible dynamical rules in
such models, comparisons among them are difficult and
the universality of the results difficult to access. The
phase diagrams and the corresponding transition lines
are obtained by enumerating all possible local configura-
tions, while the fraction of cooperators in each phase is
measured in Monte Carlo simulations. Some of the re-
gions appearing in these phase diagrams may also be ob-
tained [48] from the analysis of the fundamental clusters
growth conditions. However, when disorder is present
(for example, as dilution), there are finite size sample
to sample fluctuations that depend on the random ini-
tial conditions and the disorder realization. In this case,
the cooperative fate of the population must be obtained
through an average over the disorder and initial states.
Although here we only considered the stationary, asymp-
totic properties of the model, it is interesting to notice
that the different regions of the phase diagram may have
their dynamic properties characterized by a Lyapunov
exponent [48], the active region where Cs and Ds coexist
being mostly chaotic (positive Lyapunov exponents).
Mobility, in its random flavor considered here, is a
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stochastic element that not only prevents the system
from being trapped in a frozen state but may also
strongly enhance the amount of cooperation in the sys-
tem, despite its tendency to evaporate and disaggregate
clusters. Besides exploring, in the universe of parameters
of a particular version of these games, the conditions un-
der which cooperation may be amplified by spatial and
mobility factors, we also discussed the microscopic mech-
anisms responsible for such behavior. Whether a back-
bone of supporting agents is essential, actually depends
on the dynamics and the parameters involved. In fact,
the parallel noiseless dynamics considered here tends to
mask the role of the percolating cluster [7]. An intrigu-
ing feature is that instead of smoothing out transitions,
when compared with the immobile system, a few extra
transitions are indeed driven by mobility. Interestingly,
the CDO case presents a new transition separating the
semi-planes S < 0 (PD) and S > 0 (SD). The other sit-
uation in which this transition appears is within mean
field. Thus, it differs from the other cases considered
here in which the so called weak version of the PD game
presents the same behavior for both S = 0+ and S = 0−.
Assuming that the timescale for collecting the payoffs
(the combat phase) and the interval between generat-
ing offspring are of the same order, the order in which
these steps are taken becomes relevant. In particular, the
growth mechanism of cooperating clusters differs whether
the diffusive step is performed after or before the repro-
duction step. In the former (COD), cooperators have
no memory of their previous encounters, carry no payoff
while diffusing and may be easily converted to defectors
once they move away from the protective zone of coopera-
tive clusters. However, diffusing defectors may be assim-
ilated by these clusters and this passive mechanism may
increase cooperation when mobility is not extremely high
or density is not too low. In the latter case (CDO), on
the other hand, the agents have memory of their previ-
ous location and may carry a large payoff, thus enabling
cooperators to actively invade regions away from the per-
colating cluster. The amount of cooperation in this case
is much larger than in the previous one.
In diffusive games, there are two competing param-
eters: density and diffusivity. While larger densities
increase the correlation between neighbors, the effect
of random diffusion depends on the density and some-
times decreases correlation. It would then be important
to compare the results presented here with those using
different updating and diffusion (random) rules, for ex-
ample, by allowing multioccupation and position swap-
ping [15, 16] or different timescales of the selection and
fitness collection processes [20].
A caveat that must be emphasized concerns the phase
diagrams and the fraction of cooperators measured in the
simulations. Although the transition lines are exact, the
densities of cooperators depicted in the previous phase
diagrams may slightly change when larger system sizes
and longer simulation runs are used. Finite size effects
are usually not taken into account once actual popula-
tions are finite both in time and space, but are of interest
for a better understanding of the model.
In summary, we presented a comprehensive study of
the PD and SD games under a deterministic synchronous
updating rule in the presence of quenched and annealed
defects. The different phases in the TS plane and the ef-
fects of dilution and mobility were discussed along with
the corresponding microscopic mechanisms. Under a
wide range of conditions, we have shown that mobility,
even if random, may be responsible for a dramatic in-
crease in the population of cooperators.
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